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Abstract: The complex (composite) systems such as the Universe allow
the different decompositions into subsystems. The Everett’s Many Times
Interpretation (MWI) heavily relies on the occurrence of decohernece that
should provide the classical reality for the Worlds. However, applying the oc-
currence of decoherence as the sufficient condition for the classical reality of
the open systems, one seems obliged to consider the different decomposition
equally (classically) realistic. But this leads to an inconsistency of the Ev-
erett’s MWI in its very foundations: why the decomposition as we perceive
it should be the only one realistic?
The Everett’s Many Worlds Interpretation of quantum mechanics is a legiti-
mate and mind-provoking an issue in the foundations of quantum mechanics.
While the consistency of the MWI is an open issue, one can pose another
question of fundamental importance not–as to the best of our knowledge–
raised in the literature yet. The question we have in mind is both the very
heart of this draft, as well as a matter of consistency of MWI in the ontolog-
ical level.
In this draft, we assume the existence of a noncontroversial, the fully con-
sistent and generally adopted MWI. Particularly, we assume that, somehow,
at least the following basic issues of MWI are properly established:
(i) the noncontroversial emergence of the probabilities within the fully
unitary evolution of the Multiverse.
(ii) the substantial role of the environment-induced decoherence as the
fundamental quantum-mechanical basis for the consistency of MWI.
While we do not predict the final outcome regarding the above points
(i) and (ii), we still refer to the point (ii) as raising another point of the
fundamental importance for the foundations of MWI.
The necessity of the decoherence effect in the foundations of MWI bears
the clear cut physical background as follows: due to the fact that a World is
an isolated physical whole, there is not the room for the decoherence effect
but the division of the World as a pair of ”open system + environment
(S +E)”, where E is the internal environment that induces decoherence for
S. Without any specific physical model for the composite system S +E, we
are still able to pose the above-mentioned question as follows in the sequel.
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We pose the following question while leaving the technical details for the
latter discussion:
(Q1) As every composite system can be nonuniquely decomposed as a
collection of the subsystemsa, we wonder if every possible division of the
World into subsystems gives rise to the one and the same conclusion regarding
the basic interpretational rule of MWI.
To this end, in order to be more specific, let us emphasize: the different
divisions of the World into subsystems can be mutually related by the linear
canonical transformationsa of the basic set of the observables (the position-
and the momentum- observables) of the constituent systems. So, given the
decomposition World = S + E, we have in mind the linear canonical trans-
formations (LCT) of the S’s and E’s observables in order to redefine the
World as: World = S ′+E ′. Given that both decompositions refer to a given
instant of time, t◦, our question (Q1) actually poses the question of consis-
tency of MWI regarding the different decompositions, S +E and S ′ +E ′, of
the one, and in the instant t◦ uniquely defined World.
This question may not be naive as it may seem prima facie.
Let us consider the following elaborations.
(1) Let us first consider the following situation: due to interaction with
S, the environment E induces decoherenceb for S, while the systems S ′ and
E ′ mutually do not interactc, and therefore there is not decoherence for the
decomposition S ′ + E ′. The consequence is then rather obvious: while there
is a splitting of the World regarding the decomposition S+E, there is not the
splitting regarding the decomposition S ′+E ′. Certainly, there is a controversy
regarding the one and the same World uniquely defined in the instant t◦.
One possible way out of this controversy may be the following stipulation
(implicit to the foundations of the decoherence theory):
(S1) one of the decompositions of the World, either S + E or S ′ + E ′ is
not physically realistic, and due to the presence of the decoherence effect in
S+E, one should consider the later, i.e. the decomposition S ′+E ′, physically
artificial (nonrealistic).
However, then appears another problem as defined by the following situ-
ation.
(2) Let us assume that both decompositions bear decoherenced: S ′ is
(also) decohered by E ′. In general, one can expect that the two kinds of
the decoherence processes are not mutually equivalent. The rule (S1) sets
that both decompositions should be equally realistic, while, in general not
necessarily physically (or information-theoretically) equivalente.
Let us be more specific: the different decompositions of state of the World
in the instant t◦ read:
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∑i
ci|φi〉S|χi〉E =
∑
α
dα|µα〉S′|να〉E′, (∗)
where the subsystems S and S ′ have nothing in common, while eq.(*) gives
for the World in the instant t◦ a nonunique decomposition–the ”pointer basis”
is not unique!
This non-equivalence raises the ontological problem, very much like the
point (1): which decomposition into the Everett branches–due to S + E, or
to S ′ + E ′–should be chosen? In other words: which Multiverse should be
considered to be physically realistic?
While this question is of the ontological nature (there is not ”observer”
or any third party in the decomposition of the World in the given instant
t◦), we do not find the answer like ”both Multiverses should be regarded
realistic” straightforwardly acceptable. In any case, we believe–including the
more general situations than those presented by (1) and (2) above–that this
issue (the issue of ”what is ’system’?”e in ”Technical Details” below) may
question the consistency of the very foundations of the Everett’s MWI.
Conclusion: It seems that, in the case the decoherence is sufficient for
the classical reality (as basically supposed to be correct in the MWI, i.e.
the Multiverse theories), then one seems obliged to reject the Everett’s (and
alike) interpertations as physically incomplete, or possibly wrong.
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TECHNICAL DETAILS
(a) the linear canonical transformations we have in mind read:
(xSi, pSi, XEj, PEj) → (ξS′k, piS′k,ΞE′l,ΠE′l) (1)
for simplicity without any constraints for the transforming variables–thus
preserving the number of the overall degrees of freedom of the World.
(b) the occurrence of decoherence for S substantially (but not exclusively)
depends on certain characteristics of the interaction HS+E–e.g. of the so-
called separability of the interaction. Virtually, the separability of interaction
is necessary for the occurrence of decoherence. The analysis refers equally
to the exact (orthogonal) or to only approximate (approximatelly orthogo-
nal) ”pointer basis”; the later directly referring to both, the so-called ”back
action” effect as well as to the (nonorthogonal) ”preferred set of states”.
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(c) the linear canonical transformation give the different forms of the one
and the same Hamiltonian:
H = HS +HE +HS+E = HS′ +HE′ +HS′+E′ (2)
while, here, HS′+E′ = 0.
(d) the expression eq. (2) bears the clear physical meaning of the LCT in
the context of the decoherence theory: in order to provide the decoherence
effect for both decompositions, both the interaction terms, HS+E and HS′+E′,
should fulfill the separability criterion–that is probably the typical situation
for the realistic models.
(e) nonequivalence requires some elaboration as given in the refs.:
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